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ABSTRACT
 
A social analog of a short-delay conditioning paradigm in
 
Pavlovian learning was used to test predictions concerning
 
the influence of stimulus context of human social judgments
 
of causality. The learning experiments was masked by
 
describing it as a study testing a computerized employee
 
evaluation system. Subjects were presented information about
 
a hypothetical worker and a fictitious company's level of
 
productivity representing a 12 or 18 month period.
 
Consistent with contemporary models of associative learning,
 
the results indicated that the subjects judgments of the
 
worker's causal priority for the company productivity effect
 
progressively strengthened as a function of repeated worker-

productivity pairings. Further, limits of this acquisition
 
effect of causal judgments were influenced by the ability of
 
another worker to predict similar productivity level
 
information. Implications for future research including
 
unblocking and augmenting are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
 
Psychology has often recognized the importance of context
 
in learning, perception, and psychophysics. The effects of
 
context on psychological processes in humans have had
 
monumental impact in how we ultimately perceive our
 
environment. As a result, we attempt to make sense out of
 
the world through event comparisons or by identifying an
 
object's relations to another. In making social causal
 
judgments (attributions) one must also be concerned with the
 
relationship(s) between two or more objects. Although
 
context and causation appear to be intimately related to how
 
we process and interpret information from events and
 
objects, social psychology has often failed to adequately
 
address context effects in causal judgments. Heider (1944)
 
recognized how context can bias our causal judgments by
 
suggesting that, "changes in the environment are almost
 
always caused by acts of persons in combination with other
 
factors" (p. 361).
 
Theories of human causal judgment have been influenced by
 
philosophers such as Hume (1964/1886) and Mill, (1972).
 
Their conceptions of cause and effect have been
 
operationalized in modern research in an attempt to devise a
 
comprehensive theory of causal attribution. Despite several
 
sophisticated well accepted attempts to explain such a
 
phenomena (i.e., Heider, 1958; Jones & Nisbett, 1969; Kelly,
 
1967; ), a comprehensive theory has not yet emerged. Various
 
inquiries have been made by theorists to organize the rules
 
of causal judgments. However, scholars continue to maintain
 
that a current disarray of attribution theory exists (Cook &
 
Campbell, 1979).
 
Purpose of the Study
 
The purpose of the present study was to design a program
 
of research investigating human causal judgments from a
 
contemporary learning-theoretical perspective. Specifically,
 
this study was designed to test "acquisition" and "blocking"
 
effects in social causal judgments. The theoretical position
 
of this thesis was assume that social outcomes or effects
 
will antomatqcally elicit a search for a cause or causes and
 
therefore, the generation of cause and effect statements.
 
This activity was termed "invariance seeking action". It was
 
also the objective of this research to demonstrate that in
 
accordance with contemporary learning theory, that causal
 
judgments,reflect the operation of a predictable mechanism
 
which serves to generate additional studies that can address
 
context effects in human causal judgments.
 
Causality
 
Philosophers have thought about causation and argued its
 
meaning for centuries (Bunge, 1979). Events, changes in
 
state, and changes in properties are ail explained and thus
 
understood by attribution to their respective causes. The
 
concept of causation is as basic to our understanding as are
 
concepts of object, space, time, and logic. Toward this end,
 
contemporary attribution theory derives its basic
 
assumptions from the traditional philosophical views of
 
cause and effect. David Hume, a British Associationist, has
 
been one of the most influential of the major philosophers,
 
establishing criteria by which a causal relation can be
 
inferred. In "A Treatise of Human Nature" (1964/1886) Hume
 
provided a more contemporary perspective on causality
 
through his highly deterministic and reductionistic view of
 
the associative process. Hume's position can be summarized
 
with four rules: 1) spatio-temporal contiauity - the cause
 
and effect must be contiguous in space and time; 2) tempora1
 
priority - causes must occur prior to their effects; 3)
 
constant union - causes and effects must occur together.;
 
and (4) the same cause always produces the same effect, and
 
the same effect never arises but from the same cause.
 
John Stuart Mill (1972) also argued that what people
 
ordinarily call the cause is arbitrarily selected and is
 
inaccurately labeled "the cause."Interestingly, Hume was
 
also influential in the development of two additional rules
 
subsequently credited to Mill. The first rule is the method
 
Of agreement - which states that if several different
 
objects produce the same effect, there must be a common
 
quality that exists among them. The second rule was termed
 
the method of differennt:^ - which states that the difference
 
in the effects of two resembling objects must come from that
 
in which they differed. That is, one can infer cause if,
 
when Y is not observed, X is not present. By using both the
 
method of agreement and the method of difference, the
 
probability that X is the cause of Y is increased. In
 
summary, if X, then Y; if not X, then not Y.
 
For example, suppose that when a particular company
 
employee is scheduled to work, that company surpasses their
 
production quota. However, when the employee is not
 
scheduled to work, and therefore not present, the company
 
fails to meet the daily production quota. Thus, it would be
 
likely that the worker's supervisor would attribute the
 
cause of the company productivity to the employee.
 
The critical realist theory of cause proposed that causal
 
perceptions are subjective constructions of the mind, while
 
causal relationships are independent of our perceptions
 
(Harre, 1972). Interestingly, critical realists also contend
 
that seeking causes and effects is biologically adaptive.
 
That is, humans are biologically prepared to automatically
 
search for causes, thereby making their environment
 
predictable. Accordingly, organisms that are capable of
 
making such cause-and-effeet associations are better
 
prepared to survive than are organisms that are not.
 
Therefore, humans make causal judgments precisely because
 
doing so has been adaptive in their evolution.
 
Theoretically, humans may be biologically prepared to make
 
causal inferences and sociologically constrained to
 
associate only certain causes and certain effects (See Kuhn,
 
1992). Critical realists also believe that observation alone
 
is not sufficient to understanding human nature, and to
 
observe relationships among events, variables must be
 
manipulated. In other words, causal inference result from
 
actions. As a result, we are biologically prepared to focus
 
on the manipulative relations between cause (X) and effect
 
(Y), and use this mechanism to better adapt to changing
 
circumstances.
 
Social Psvchology
 
Historically, investigations of causality have been
 
highly influential in the development of attribution
 
theories and research in social psychology. For example,
 
Michotte (1956) demonstrated that humans perceive cause in
 
concordance with Hume's (1964/1886) rules of causality, and
 
Shultz (1982) was influenced by Kant's (1982/1964) view
 
that, "causal relations are characterized by forces of
 
generative transmission between cause and effect" (p. 3).
 
Specifically, attribution theories try to explain the
 
processes by which people attribute characteristics and
 
traits to others in order to make causal inferences about
 
other people's behaviors (Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967,
 
1972, 1973). Contemporary models of attribution which looked
 
at choosing from a variety of putative causes the most
 
predictive cause for a particular effect address these ideas
 
{Kelley, 1972; Wasserman, 1990).
 
Fritz Heider (1944) provided the conceptual foundation
 
from which most modern attribution theories were derived.
 
Heider's contributions to attribution theory include his
 
study of the processes and variables involved in how people
 
make causal attributions (Weary, Stanley, & Harvey, 1989).
 
Initially, Heider (1958) was curious about the process by
 
which an untrained observer makes sense out of the actions
 
of others . Heider's work on causality emphasized that
 
appropriate cause and effect attributions are given to
 
stabilize the perceived environment. He believed that when
 
ordinary people observe an effect in their environment, they
 
immediately search for its cause(s). He suggested that
 
ordinary people operate like "naive scientists" when making
 
attributions. More specifically, people observe an action
 
and then, in a analytical way, they attempt to find the
 
connections among various causes and effects. He explained
 
the role Of such causal judgments as bringing a degree of
 
consistency and predictability to an individual's
 
environment, since an unstable environment is potentially
 
aversive and stress inducing. Heider proposed that "the
 
search for Invariances" served to diminish the impact of our
 
continuously variant environment.
 
Heider argued that people were not simply content to
 
register the pbservations around them, but were motivated to
 
bring order to the world by determining intention, ability,
 
and environmental properties. Heider suggested that a
 
persons ability to control the environment depended on the
 
recognition of causal relationships. Notions of personal
 
control are closely related to the philosophical position of
 
both critical realists (Harre, 1972) and learning theorists
 
(e.g. Garcia & Koelling, 1966; Seligman, 1970). For example,
 
the critical realists view looking for causes as
 
biologically adaptive and therefore is a part of human
 
genetic makeup. Similarly, some learning theorists suggest
 
there exists innate biological mechanisms which promote
 
specific associations biologically relevant to the
 
organism's survival. Consistent with these positions, the
 
theoretical viewpoint of this thesis proposed that"social
 
effects or outcomes" automatically elicit a search for
 
causes and the generation of cause-effect statements on the
 
part of the observer (for a discussion of directed action
 
see Cramer, Weiss, Steigleder, & Balling, 1985; Dickinson &
 
Balleine, 1994; Hearst & Jenkins, 1974; O'Connell &
 
Rachotte, 1982). We have termed this activity invariance
 
seeking action, and consider it to be analogous to an
 
unconditioned response (See Rule of Correspondence 3 given
 
below).
 
Building on Heider's conceptual framework, Jones and
 
Davis (1965), developed the theory of correspondent-

inference which focused on the relationship between the
 
effects of an action and the dispositions inferred by those
 
effects. The theory predicted that observers generally
 
attribute behavior to dispositional characteristics when the
 
environment or setting does not provide a sufficient
 
explanation. This bias toward attributing the cause of
 
behavior to personal characteristics of the actor are said
 
to be the result of observers failing to adequately adjust
 
their initial causal judgments to reflect additional
 
information about possible environmental constraints on the
 
behavior. Correspondence refers to the extent that a
 
behavior and characteristics of an individual are both
 
accounted for by the inference. The context in which a
 
particular act occurs can provide the observer with greater
 
meaning for the act; and the perceived intention of that act
 
is dependent on other possible actions that are available in
 
that particular situation. For example, if a supervisor
 
observes that when a particular company employee is working
 
and the company surpasses its quota, the supervisor may
 
conclude that the employee is an efficient worker. This
 
dispositional inference directly corresponds to the observed
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behavior (e.g. surpassing quotas follow from efficient
 
work). On the other hand, a supervisor may also infer that
 
the employee received considerable help from coworkers in
 
order to perform so well, or possibly the production quotas
 
were not high enough. These latter causes are representative
 
of external or situational factors and do not represent
 
correspondent inferences.
 
Specifically, we pay more attention and infer
 
dispositional "cause" to those behaviors which are freely
 
chosen, produce noncommon effects and are low in social
 
desirability (Jones & Davis, 1965). Correspondent inferences
 
directly result from the amount of information given by the
 
action and are determined by the three conditions noted
 
above. Behaviors that are assumed to be freely chosen are
 
ones that follow from an individual who acts on his/her own
 
volition. As a result, the perceiver tends to make
 
dispositional attributions because he/she holds the
 
individual accountable for his/her own behavior. If an
 
individual's behavior is not freely chosen (e.g. results
 
from coercion or manipulation), the perceiver may hold the
 
individual less responsible for the act, and other causes
 
which are not dispositional, are utilized to explain the
 
behavior. Interestingly, behavior that is not freely chosen
 
has also been found to elicit dispositional attributions.
 
This "fundamental attribution error" lends support to
 
Heider's notion that the individual tends to engulf the
 
social field. As a result, people making attributions tend
 
to be biased in favor of internal or dispositional causation
 
(Gilbert & Jones, 1986; Jones & Harris, 1967; Ross, 1977).
 
Noncommon effects are distinctive outcomes that can.only
 
follow from a particular act. For example, suppose that Joe
 
is a company manager and he and other managers always wear a
 
tie. Wearing a tie could be considered a "common effect."
 
However, if one day Joe does not wear a tie to work, this
 
action may represent a "noncommon effect," relative to the
 
other managers' consistent choice of dress. The observer in
 
this situation is more likely to make a dispositional
 
inference regarding Joe's actions. One might infer that Joe
 
no longer has a professional attitude about his job, is
 
having a mid-life crisis, or is rebelling against company
 
authority (dispositional attributions). Jones and Davis
 
suggested that noncommon effects increase the likelihood
 
that an observer will make a correspondent inference (see
 
also Ajzen, 1971).
 
Engaging in a behavior that is socially desirable has
 
been found to be less informative than unexpected or
 
socially undesirable behavior, and is expected to result in
 
correspondence inferences. That is, a person's behavior that
 
reflects values commonly shared by the culture, the less
 
informative that action is when identifying attributes of
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the person. Socially desirable behavior results in the
 
observer being less confident about the inferences made
 
regarding the intent of the behavior as opposed to
 
situations where the action is considered socially
 
undesirable (Jones, Davis, & Gergen, 1961). In summary, the
 
Jones and Davis model suggests that freely chosen, socially
 
undesirable behaviors which produce noncommon effects create
 
a "dispositional anchor" in the observer which leads to
 
increases in internal or dispositional attributions (Ajzen,
 
1971; Jones & Davis, 1965).
 
Heider suggested that people might employ a variant of
 
Hume's method of difference when choosing from among several
 
putative causes, and it was from these seminal ideas that
 
Kelley (1973) developed his model of causal attribution.
 
Kelley's model attempts to explain dispositional and
 
situational attributions for the behavior of one's self, as
 
well as of others. Recall, that Jones and Davis (1965) only
 
accounted for behavior that is initiated by others. Kelley's
 
initial interest in attribution was to address the question
 
of what information is used in arriving at casual
 
attributions. Kelley also distinguished between
 
attributions based on two different sources of information:
 
1) attribution when the observer has information from
 
multiple observations, and 2) where the observer has
 
information from only a single observation or description.
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Contemporary researchers label the two sources of
 
infojnnatlon as experienced and described causal situations,
 
respectively. Kelley's covariation principle, described
 
below, requires multiple observations, experienced causal
 
situations, or what Bertrand Russell termed "knowledge by
 
acquaintance" (See Shanks, 1991). Kelley's theory which is
 
based on the cdvariation principle states that humans search
 
for causes which occur close together in time and space with
 
particular effects. Consistent with Hume, Kelley argued that
 
priority is given to the cause which is present when the
 
effect is present and which is absent when the effect is
 
absent (Kelley & Michela, 1980).
 
According to Kelley (1973), attributers use three types
 
of information to infer cause and effect relationships. The
 
three types of information are: 1) consensus - the extent to
 
which others react in the same manner to a stimulus or event
 
as the individual being observed; 2) consistency - the
 
extent to which an individual reacts to the same stimulus or
 
event in the same way on other occasions; and 3)
 
distinctiveness - the extent to which the individual being
 
observed reacts in the same manner to other, different
 
stimuli or events. For example, Kelley would suggest with
 
low consensus, low distinctiveness, and high consistency,
 
the effect will be attributed to something about the person
 
(i.e. a dispositional attribution). McArthur (1972)
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systematically varied consensus, distinctiveness, and
 
consistency information pertaining to a behavioral act and
 
asked subjects to indicate the cause they perceived as most
 
plausible. Consistent with previous findings (e.g. Jones &
 
Nisbett, 1969), the observers tended to attribute behavior
 
to dispositions rather than to context.
 
When multiple observations are not possible (which is
 
typical of many of the inferences we make), attribution for
 
a single instance is presumed to follow what Kelley (1972,
 
1973) refers to as configuration. This is where a perceiver
 
must take into account the configuration of several
 
judgments on similar observed effects. In this instance
 
principles of discounting and augmenting are used instead of
 
covariation.
 
According to Kelley, plausible causes of an observed
 
effect(s) can either be inhibitory (discounted) or
 
facilitative (augmented). The discounting principle states
 
that : "The role of a given cause in producing a given
 
effect is discounted if other plausible causes are also
 
present" (p. 113). For example, assume two company
 
employees, Sam and Joe, work together. If in each month
 
that they work together, the company surpasses its monthly
 
production quota, each employee will be given less causal
 
weight than if they worked had alone. Since Sam and Joe are
 
both potential causes, for the performance, each employee is
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discounted as being solely responsible for causing the
 
effect.
 
Kelley's augmenting principle suggests, if for a given
 
effect, both a plausible facilitative cause and a plausible
 
inhibitory cause were present, the role of the facilitative
 
cause in producing the effect will be judged greater than if
 
the cause was presented alone as a plausible cause for the
 
effect. That is, a cause was still effective in producing
 
the behavior despite the presence of an inhibitor, and as a
 
result, its causal priority will be augmented.
 
In summary, attribution theory is an extension of the
 
philosophical concept of cause and effect applied to human
 
thought processes. Ideas of the early philosophers provided
 
the backbone of modern attribution theory. Heider (1944) and
 
the critical realists argued that human causal judgment
 
serve an adaptive evolutionary role because they bring
 
consistency to the environment. Though several theories of
 
human causal judgments have been developed, none can
 
successfully explain all of the findings in a variety of
 
attribution situations. For example, Quattrone (1982)
 
reported a situation in which subjects were sensitized to
 
environmental factors at the expense of dispositional
 
characteristics and subsequently attributed behavior
 
(erroneously) to the environmental factors. Jones and
 
Davis' (1969) theory of correspondent inference predicted
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just the opposite. Perhaps it is possible that current
 
attribution theories, because they are based, in part, on a
 
simple contiguity mechanism (to be discussed in the next
 
section), are limited in their ability to predict many
 
aspects of human causal judgment. The contextual factors in
 
determining cause have just recently be investigated
 
(Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986). Holder's (1958) "engulfing
 
hypothesis" interprets behavior as more salient than
 
contextual influences. Therefore, causal attributions will
 
most likely reflect the dispositional characteristics of the
 
actor, and because contextual influences are less salient,
 
they will receive less causal priority. Certainly, much of
 
attribution research, can be traced by Heider's work (Jones
 
& Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967, 1972, 1973), but these
 
approaches does not satisfactorily explain that external
 
causal attributions may result when situational constraints
 
are salient.
 
Although attribution theory does not focus on what Tolman
 
and Brunswick (1935) called the "causal texture of the
 
environment," contemporary learning theory has focused much
 
attention on the topic of context (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner,
 
1972; Wagner & Rescorla, 1972). In addition, contemporary
 
theorists (e.g.. Alloy & Tabachanik, 1984; Gluck & Bower,
 
1988) have suggested that causal attributions or contingency
 
judgments closely parallel the conditioned response in
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animals in associative learning studies (see Allan, 1993;
 
Lovibond, 1988). Specifically, Rescorla (1988) noted that
 
"The CS/US relations required for conditioning are very
 
similar to those that a rational scientist would demand to
 
conclude that the CS is the cause of the US" (p. 340, see
 
also Dickinson, 1980). Contemporary learning theorists have
 
also extended that role of contiguity in causal judgments to
 
include a contingency mechanism (Shanks & Dickinson, 1987;
 
William, 1994). Attribution research has relied heavily on a
 
simple contiguity mechanism (Kelley's covariation
 
principle), may also benefit from this theoretical
 
extension. Therefore, contemporary learning theory may
 
provide valuable theoretical tools needed to extend our
 
understanding of human causal analysis.
 
Learning Theory
 
The British associationists (e.g. John Locke, Thomas 
Brown, and David Hume) formulated the rules by which 
associations are thought to develop. The cornerstone of the 
association rules was contiguity. Theoretically, events 
(stimuli) that occur together in time and space will be 
associated. Pavlov's classical conditioning research 
established the validity of the contiguity concept. In a 
simple classical conditioning situation, a neutral stimulus 
becomes a conditioned stimulus (CS) through repeated 
pairings with a biologically significant stimulus —■ the 
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unconditioned stimulus (US) — that elicits an unconditioned
 
response (UR). When the organism forms an association
 
between the CS and the US, the response to the CS is termed
 
the conditioned response (CR). For example, if a tone
 
(neutral stimulus) is repeatedly paired with food - a
 
biologically significant stimulus, test animals have been
 
observed to salivate (CR) to the tone (CS).
 
However, learning theorists today do not accept the
 
sufficiency of simple contiguity in the development of
 
associations (Kamin, 1969; Rescorla, 1968; Rescorla &
 
Wagner, 1972). This rejection is based on the argument that
 
simple contiguity is not applicable to most learning
 
situations, because most learning situations are
 
characterized by the presence of multiple CS's rather than a
 
single functional CS. Because the organism must select from
 
competing stimuli within a specific context, the learning
 
task has been termed the stimulus selection problem. Rudy
 
and Wagner (1975) described this problem as "one of
 
specifying the rules whereby a relationship will or will not
 
appear to be learned about depending upon the context of
 
environmental events within which it is imbedded." (p. 270).
 
A finding contrary to a prediction based on simple
 
contiguity is stimulus "overshadowing." Suppose two stimuli
 
are presented in a compognd and followed by US
 
presentations, but one stimulus in the compound is more
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salient (e.g. brighter, louder) than the other. Although
 
both stimuli are contiguous with the US an equal number of
 
times, the two stimuli do not gain equal strength in
 
eliciting CR's. In this situation the more salient stimulus
 
overshadows the other, in terms of associative strength
 
acquired. One plausible explanation for this difference
 
might be that the more salient stimulus is attended to more
 
than the less salient stimulus. The principle of simple
 
contiguity fails to explain the overshadowing effect. If
 
simple contiguity was necessary and sufficient for
 
conditioning to occur, then each CS (the more and less
 
intense) in the compound would have conditioned equally.
 
The overshadowing research (Kamin, 1968; Wagner, Logan,
 
Haberlandt, & Price, 1968) began a new era in learning
 
theory by initiating inquiry into the nature of selective
 
association.
 
Support for a "blocking effect," based on prior
 
experience to a particular stimulus not stimulus saliency
 
comes from a series of studies by Kamin (1968, 1969).
 
Blocking occurs when one stimulus (A) is reinforced prior to
 
its presentation in a compound with another stimulus (X).
 
Because of the prior conditioning to stimulus A, stimulus X,
 
in subsequent reinforced training trials (AX+), acquires
 
less associative strength (i.e. blocked). That is, the
 
associative strength conditioned to X depends on the
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stimulus context in which it is paired with a US. If
 
stimulus X is presented alone with a US, it will reach an
 
asymptotic value close to that when stimulus A was presented
 
alone. If stimulus X is presented in compound with A, and A
 
already predicts conditioning to the US, conditioning to X
 
is blocked. Again the principle of simple contiguity fails
 
to explain the blocking effect.
 
In demonstrating the blocking effect Kamin (1968, 1969)
 
developed a three phase experimental sequence using a
 
conditioned suppression procedure. During phase one,
 
stimulus (A) was paired with the US in the experimental
 
group, while a control group received no single stimulus
 
conditioning. During phase two the experimental and control
 
group received conditioning trials in which stimulus (A) is
 
presented in a compound with (X) and paired with the US
 
(AX+). A subsequent test of response strength to stimulus
 
(X) alone indicates that less conditioning occurred to
 
stimulus (X) in the experimental group than in the control
 
group. Arguably, conditioning to (X) was blocked in the
 
experimental group because prior conditioning to (A) reached
 
asymptote thus allowing the US to become ineffective and
 
therefore no new conditioning to (X) could occur. Rescorla
 
(1968) successfully explained findings such as overshadowing
 
and blocking using a contingency mechanism. The contingency
 
principle emphasized not only the way the stimuli are
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paired, but also the number of times each stimulus occurs by
 
itself. Because contingency is analogous to correlation a
 
CS that is contingent with a US will predict, in varying
 
degrees, the presence or absence of the US. Conditioning
 
therefore depends not only on the contiguity between the CS
 
and US, but on the type of information that the CS provides
 
about the occurrence of the US. Rescorla (1968) described
 
this as "the relative probability of occurrence of the US in
 
the presence of the CS as contrasted with its probability in
 
the absence of the CS" (p.l). For conditioning to occur, it
 
is not only necessary that the stimuli be paired
 
(contiguous), but that they be paired in a specific way.
 
Conditioning is no longer seen as a mechanical process in
 
which the control over a response is passed from one
 
stimulus to another. Drawing from the associationist
 
tradition in philosophy, conditioning is viewed as the
 
learning that results from exposure to relations among
 
events in the environment. The insufficiency of simple
 
contiguity for producing conditioning can be illustrated by
 
results that have been available for some time.
 
Social Learning
 
The proposed research assumed that attributional
 
judgments are learned responses to events occurring in
 
context. Following Hume (1888), Shanks and Dickinson
 
(1987), noted that, "a causal judgment is seen as reflecting
 
20
 
no more than the strength of the relevant association
 
between the mental representations of the cause and effect,
 
with the principles governing such attributions being those
 
of associative learning." (p.230). Hence, an interpretation
 
of causal judgments based on modern learning-theoretical
 
principles would provide a base from which to predict
 
effects of stimulus salience (e.g. the conditions in which
 
behavior does and does not engulf the social field.),
 
overshadowing and blocking effects, effect variation (e.g.
 
US intensity), and the conditions necessary to select from a
 
variety of putative causes presented in compound.
 
Recent studies of causal judgments, although not normally
 
addressed in terms of stimulus selection, have investigated
 
contextual variables and their effect on causal judgments
 
(Algom & Bizman, 1983; Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984; Gluck &
 
Bower, 1988; Shanks & Dickinson, 1987; Wasserman, 1990). In
 
demonstrating parallels between animal conditioning and
 
human causal judgments. Shanks and Dickinson (1987) showed
 
that when human subjects are given a task to judge the
 
relationship between an action and an outcome, their
 
judgments are sensitive to contingencies between the
 
probability of the outcome given the action P(0/A) and the
 
probability of the outcome given no action P(0/-A) (recall
 
Rescorla, 1968). Previous research has also shown that
 
acquisition and blocking effects occur in human learning
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(Chapman, 1991; Chapman & Robbins, 1990; Cramer, Weiss,
 
Steigleder, & Balling 1985; Dickinson, Shanks, & Evenden,
 
1984; Shanks, 1985), Using an operant learning paradigm,
 
Dickinson et al. (1984) asked subjects to judge the extent
 
to which pressing a key caused an effect to occur on a
 
computer screen. In the first stage of the study Subjects
 
witnessed trials on which an alternative cue (B) reliably
 
predicted the effect. In the second stage, subjects
 
performed the action (A) at the same time cue (B) occurred,
 
and this combination of potential causes was followed by
 
the effect. Finally, subjects made judgments about the
 
causal relationship between the action and the effect.
 
Dickinson et al. found that the subject's judgments were
 
significantly reduced in the blocking condition compared to
 
the control condition in which cue (B) had not been paired
 
with the effect in the first stage.
 
In a more recent study, Wasserman (1990) evaluated the
 
parallels between animal associative learning and human
 
causal judgments by exploring the empirical convergence of
 
experimental manipulations in both domains. Wasserman (1974)
 
showed that in his autoshaping procedure with pigeons, and
 
in his study with humans (1990), the learning curves of
 
pigeon keypecks and human causal ratings over differential
 
correlations of stimulus compounds, demonstrated a similar
 
pattern. In Wasserman's study (1990) college students were
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asked to judge the efficacy of three foods (peanuts, shrimp
 
and strawberries) in causing a patient's allergic reaction.
 
Food combinations were varied along with the presence or
 
absence of the allergic reaction. Wasserman found that if a
 
subject can predict that shrimp, for example, cause the
 
allergic reaction and peanuts did not, shrimp is given
 
causal priority. More specifically,,shrimp and peanuts had
 
different associative strengths depending upon the
 
differential Correlation with the occurrence or non-

occurrence of the illness. However, if a Subject would not
 
discriminate whether or not it was the shrimp or the peanuts
 
causing the allergic reaction, then both foods were given
 
causal priority. In essence/ both foods had the same
 
associative strength. Consistent with contemporary learning
 
theory, Wasserman demonstrated that subjects trying to judge
 
an effect from multiple causes use information about the
 
differential predictiveness of each of the stimuli.
 
The developments in the research mentioned above
 
indicated the possibility that models of associative
 
learning may have explanatory value in human causal
 
judgments, in addition, what seems to be common among all
 
of the studies previously mentioned, is how the perceiver
 
makes causal judgments given information about the
 
differential associative strength or probabilities of
 
potential causes and effects in the causal judgment task.
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Therefore, social causal judgrnents in the present study were
 
addressed in terms of the stimulus selection problem.
 
Statement of the Problem
 
Several theoretical frameworks have been postulated to
 
explain human perception of causation from a social
 
psychological perspective (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967; Jones
 
& Davis, 1965), and a learning perspective (Allan, 1993;
 
Shanks & Dickinson, 1987). In general, these two approaches
 
represent social psychologist's "rule governed" explanations
 
versus learning psychologist's associationist models.
 
Consistent with these two approaches however are concepts
 
such as the covariation principle and simple contignity.
 
Unfortunately, even with the widespread use Of these
 
principles by attribution theorists, certain attribution
 
effects are more difficult to explain by a "rule-gOverned"
 
approach (e.g. acquisition, augmenting, blocking,
 
contingency effects, overshadowing) when compared to the
 
learning approach. The present study is a part of a series
 
of investigations which explored attribution hypotheses
 
using well-established conditioning principles. By employing
 
general learning theory, the stimulus selection problem
 
noted above will be addressed. Clearly, support for the use
 
of learning theory in the prediction of individual behavior
 
has been successfully demonstrated (e.g., Cottrell, 1968;
 
Cramer, Weiss, Steigleder, & Balling, 1985; Dollard &
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Miller, 1950; Lott & Lott, 1968, 1972; Steigleder, Weiss,
 
Cramer, & Feinberg, 1978; Zajonc, 1965). Using a general
 
programmatic approach termed "extension of liberalized S-R
 
theory" by Neal Miller (1959), this project proposed that
 
under certain conditions, human causal judgments reflect
 
acquired response priorities that can be attenuated or
 
blocked. In such instances the US is the behavior or
 
environmental effect that elicits a search for an
 
explanation (e.g., in the present research a small company's
 
level of productivity for a given month). The CSs are the
 
putative causes (e.g., employees in a Company), and a causal
 
judgment represents the strength of association between the
 
effect and one or more of the putative causes. Hence, the
 
attribution of cause is simply an indication that an
 
association has been formed between a specific
 
stimulus/putative cause and an effect.
 
Technique of Theory Construction
 
Through the use of analogy, a relatively well understood
 
conditioning paradigm was used to guide the investigation of
 
a less well-understood research area (e.g. social causal
 
judgments in context). In particular, analogies were be
 
drawn between independent and dependent variables in
 
learning and the variables assumed to be important in the
 
development of social causal judgments. Consistent with this
 
construction, the relations holding among the variables in
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the conditioning model should, theoretically, hold among the
 
corresponding social attribution variables (Campbell, 1920;
 
Hesse, 1966, 1974, 1980; Masterman, 1980; Oppenheimer,
 
1956).
 
Rules of Correspondence.
 
Although the rules developed here are illustrative rather
 
than exhaustive they are sufficiently detailed to permit
 
initial theoretical development. The derivation of
 
acquisition and blocking effects follows. Corresponding to a
 
conditioned stimulus (CS), or antecedent stimulus, is a
 
discriminable social stimulus, such as a worker (Rule 19.
 
Corresponding to an unconditioned stimulus (US) or a
 
consequent is a social stimulus, such as a company's
 
productivity level, which elicits "invariance seeking action
 
(ISA)" (Rule 2), and the ISA so elicited is analogous to an
 
unconditioned response (UR) (Rule 3). The conditioned form
 
of the UR analog (strength, speed, or probability of
 
invariance seeking action) corresponds to a conditioned
 
response (CR) (Rule 4). The number of CS-US pairings
 
(reinforced trials) corresponds to the number of CS analog ­
US analog pairings, such as the number of times the worker
 
is paired with company productivity information, and
 
constitute "invariance seeking action" acquisition trials
 
(Rule 5). A trial on which the worker is not followed by
 
production information represents a CS alone or extinction
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trial (Rule, 6). Presenting US-analogs in the absence of CS-

analogs constitutes a US alone trial, such as presenting
 
company productivity information when a specific worker was
 
not present (Rule 7). Cdrresponding to a reinforced
 
compound CS trial is a ISA trial where two or more social
 
stimuli, such as worker (A) and worker (X) are jointly
 
paired with company productivity information (Rule R).
 
Corresponding to the CS saliency is the saliency or
 
vividness of the CS analog (Rule 9k. The intensity of a
 
social stimulus, such as production information for
 
eliciting "invariahce seeking action" corresponds to the
 
intensity of the US (Rule 10). Corresponding to an
 
inhibition procedure is presenting two social CS analogs
 
(one previously paired with the effect of interest (A) and
 
one a novel stimulus (X) not followed by the effect of
 
interest; theoretically stimulus X becomes a conditioned
 
inhibitor of causal attribution) (Rule m.
 
Hypotheses
 
Acquisition Effeots. ContP^Tripr.rary r-r^na-i t-i ng models
 
suggest that repeated pairings of a neutral cue (CS) with
 
reinforcement (US) will contribute to the cue's acquisition
 
of associative strength. A negatively accelerated increasing
 
learning curve for the conditioned response (CR) will
 
result. Developing and manipulating analogous attribution
 
independent and dependent variables should produce empirical
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relationships which are similar to the conditioning
 
relationships noted above. Hence, we predicted that
 
repeatedly pairing a single worker (A) (CS analog) with
 
company prodiictivity information (US analog) would result in
 
the development of stronger casual attributions to the
 
worker. "Invariance seeking actions" {(ISA) = CR analog}
 
should be evidenced by mapping negatively accelerated
 
increasing ISA's across evaluation trials. (Rules of
 
Correspondence 1-5).
 
Blocking Effects. The blocking effect hypothesis is derived
 
from the expectation that conditioning to a single
 
antecedent stimulus takes place in a context containing any
 
number of other stimuli. Hence, we predicted that causal
 
attributions to a target worker X will be blocked if he is
 
paired with company productivity information in the presence
 
of another worker A who reliably predicts the same
 
productivity level. In other words, blocking should be
 
evidenced by weaker casual attributions to the worker X
 
because he is reinforced in context with another worker who
 
has a history of being associated with the same
 
productivity level. (Rules of Correspondence 1-5 and 8).
 
METHOD
 
Subjects
 
Subjects were 72 students (36 male and 36 female) from
 
California State University, San Bernardino who were
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recruited from undergraduate psychology courses. All
 
subjects were naive to the nature of the experiment and were
 
randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions.
 
All subjects were treated according to the ethical
 
principles of the American Psychological Association.
 
Members of the Social Learning Research Group conducted the
 
experiment.
 
Experimental Design
 
In classical conditioning a discriminable antecedent
 
stimulus is paired with a discriminable consequent stimulus.
 
In the present study the antecedent stimuli were fictional
 
workers named Sam {Stimulus A) and Joe (Stimulus X). The
 
consequent stimulus was a fictional company's productivity
 
level. The experiment can be described as a 3X6, Groups X
 
Trials repeated measures design. The first independent
 
variable (3 levels) will be the context in which the target
 
worker Joe (Xj, is paired with the company productivity
 
information. The level of productivity was a held constant
 
across all trials. Invariance seeking action trials
 
constituted the second independent variable (6 levels). The
 
subject's strength of causal attributions to worker X,
 
defined as the subject's estimate of worker X's
 
effectiveness in causing the company's level of productivity
 
(i.e. strength of invariance seeking action), measured on a
 
0-100 point scale, was be the primary dependent variable.
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other secondary dependent variables, also measured on 0-100
 
point scales, included subject ratings on the following: 1)
 
subject's confidence in his/her rating of worker X's
 
effectiveness; and 2) worker X's chances of becoming a
 
permanent employee.
 
Masking Task
 
The classical conditioning analog experiment was masked
 
as a study investigating a computerized Employee Evaluation
 
System. This procedure allowed for repeatedly pairing
 
workers with information about the company's productivity
 
level. Subjects were instructed as follows: "In this study
 
we are interested in testing the usefulness of this
 
automated program. In order to carefully test the
 
effectiveness of the system, it will be necessary for you to
 
assume the role of a production supervisor in a small
 
company." Further instructions indicated that,;"Sam and Joe
 
are college students who are available for part-time
 
employment. It is important to evaluate them carefully
 
because they will be considered for full-time employment
 
upon graduation."
 
Apparatus
 
The subject module was controlled using an IBM 386 PC
 
and the Micro Experimental Language (MEL) version 120. Using
 
MEL, a picture of a hypothetical worker(s), together with
 
information in graphic form about a fictional company's
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level of productivity, was presented to the subjects.
 
Following the presentation of the worker(s) and the graph,
 
MEL presented a series of questions to which the subject
 
responded on a scale ranging from 0-100 using a standard
 
computer keyboard. For example, the first question following
 
each target worker X trial read, "On the scale below
 
indicate the extent to which the worker Joe was effoctive in
 
causing the company's level of productivity?" Subjects
 
responses could range from O=totally ineffective to
 
100=totally effective. Another question allowed the
 
measurement of subject's confidence in rating the worker's
 
performance and read, "How confident are you about your
 
ratings of the worker (Joe) being effective in causing the
 
company's level of productivity?" A third question read, "Gn
 
the scale below, indicate the worker's (Joe) chances of
 
becoming a permanent employee." This final question served
 
to support the masking task.
 
Procedure
 
Recruitment and Informed Consent. Subjects were asked to
 
report to room 323 in the Biology Building where they were
 
given preliminary instructions regarding their participation
 
in a Study designed to test a new "automated Employee
 
Evaluation System." Upon entering the laboratory, subjects
 
were asked to read and sign a consent form. Subjects who
 
agreed to participate were randomly assigned to one of three
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experimental groups. Each group had 24 subjects balanced for
 
gender.
 
Group 1 (A+/.AX+ (Randomized)). The purpose of Group 1 was
 
to test the blocking of causal attribution strength to
 
worker X in a context that included another worker. A, who
 
already predicted a high level of company productivity.
 
Subjects received 18 trials. The first 12 trials were
 
combined trials representing single stimulus and compound
 
stimulus training. On 6 A+ trials the worker Sam was
 
presented for 5 seconds and then together with company
 
productivity information for an additional 10 seconds. This
 
procedure was analogous to a short delay conditioning
 
procedure in Pavlovian learning. Following each A+ trial,
 
subjects responded to the three questions described above
 
modified to reflect an evaluative interest in the worker
 
Sam. Each question was presented for 15 seconds. On the 6
 
AX+ trials, the worker Sam and the worker Joe were paired
 
together for 5 seconds and then with company productivity
 
information for an additional 10 seconds. Following each
 
trial, the subject evaluated either Sam or Joe; hence, each
 
worker was evaluated three times. In Group 1, the A+ and AX+
 
trials were randomized with the caveat that the first trial
 
was an A+ trial. On the final 6 trials, subjects were
 
presented with the worker Joe and company productivity
 
information using the temporal parameters described above.
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Following each of the X+ trials, subjects evaluated the
 
worker Joe using the three questions described above. The
 
Group 1 procedure allowed us:to condition causal strength to
 
Sam on the A+ trials. As a result, oh the AX+ trials Joe
 
was paired with company production information in the
 
context of someone who predicted this effect, worker Sam.
 
Blocking of causal attribution strength to Joe was expected
 
to be observed on the 6 X+ test trials.
 
Group 2 (A-I-/AX+ (Phase)). The purpose of Group 2 was also
 
to test for the blocking effect using a different procedure
 
for presenting the A+ and AX+ trials. Subjects in Group 2
 
were treated similarly to subjects in Group 1 except the A+
 
and AX+ trials were presented in two separate phases (A+
 
first and the AX+ following); 6 X+ trials followed the phase
 
training. Therefore, the first 6 trials included a worker
 
Sam paired with company productivity information (A+). The
 
next six trials consisted of workers Sam and Joe paired
 
together with the company meeting the same level of
 
productivity {AX+). The remaining six trials functioned as
 
test trials with the worker Joe paired with the company
 
productivity information (X+).
 
Group 3 (AX+). Group 3 served as a control group for Groups
 
1 and 2. Subjects in Group 3 were treated similarly to
 
subjects in Group 1 except the subjects were given a total
 
of 12 worker-productivity trials. The first six trials
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included the workers Sam and Joe paired together with the
 
company productivity information (AX+). The remaining six
 
trials were test trials where the worker Joe was paired with
 
the same company productivity level (X+). The experiment
 
was designed to test the hypothesis that subjects in Group 3
 
would provide stronger causal attributions to the worker Joe
 
than subjects in Groups 1 and 2.
 
Debriefing
 
Before leaving the lab, subjects were completely
 
debriefed regarding the purpose and goals of the research
 
study, and all of their questions were answered.
 
RESULTS
 
The analysis focused on the subjects' ratings of causal
 
strength to a worker and the subjects' confidence in their
 
judgments. The dependent variables used to test the
 
hypotheses were measured following each of the 6 A+
 
acquisition trials in Group 2, and the 6 X+ test trials in
 
each group. The means and standard deviations for the
 
subjects' estimates of cause are presented in Table 1. A
 
simple repeated measures model and a Groups by Trials model
 
were used to test predictions regarding acquisition effects
 
and blocking effects, respectively. Analysis for the
 
possibility of gender effects revealed no reliable gender
 
related results. Therefore, in the analysis reported below
 
the gender variable was collapsed.
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Acquisition
 
To examine the acquisition of causal strength a simple
 
repeated measures ANOVA was performed on subjects' causal
 
ratings across 6 A+ trials. As predicted. Group 2 (Phase)
 
evidenced a gradual learning curve of causal strength to
 
stimulus A (Sam, see Figure 1). The simple repeated measures
 
ANOVA revealed a significant acquisition effect for Causal
 
strength, £ (5, 115) = 4.32, p. < .001.
 
Blpckiug
 
Drawing from contemporary learning research we predicted
 
that social causal judgments are not merely a function of
 
covariation, but are influenced by contextual cues.
 
Specifically, Groups 1 and 2 tested causal attribution
 
strength to worker X (Joe) in a context that included
 
another worker, A (Sam), who predicted a high level of
 
company productivity using random and phase procedures,
 
respectively. Subjects' causal attributions to worker X in
 
Groups 1 and 2 were compared to causal attribution to worker
 
X in Group 3. Blocking of causal attributions to X were
 
expected in Groups 1 and 2. In addition, an analysis for the
 
possibility of group effects fbr conditions 1 and 2 revealed
 
no reliable differences, F (1, 46) = 3.93, p> .05.
 
Group 1 (A+/AX+ (Randomized)). Subjects mean causal strength
 
to worker X was higher in Group 3 than the ratings in Group
 
1. As expected. Group 1 (Random) and Group 3 (Control)
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Table 1,
 
Descgiptlve Statistics for the Independent: and the Dependen-t-

Variables. 
Groups A+ Test Trials 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Acquisition 
M 66.0 75.4 78.4 79.5 81.0 79.1 
GP 26.8 19.7 14.0 12.2 12.4 13.0 
Groups x+ Test Trials 
Group 1 
65.5 66.9 67.2 67.5 72.0 69.2 
SR 19.5 15.8 16.2 15.8 17.1 17.9 
Group 2 
M 73.8 75.3 75.7 76.7 76.2 76.3 
sa 13.9 13.1 13.7 13.1 13.9 13.9 
Group 3 
M 84.8 83.1 82.3 82.6 80,3 83.2 
SR 7.8 7.5 8.6 11.4 12.0 10.9 
Note: N = 24 
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Figure 1
 
Acquisition Curve of Causal Judgments for Worker A+ (Sam) in
 
Group 2 (Phase)
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differed in mean causal strength ratings to worker X (Joe),
 
see Figure 2. A 2 X 6 (Groups X Trials) repeated measures
 
ANOVA revealed a significant group effect, F (1, 46) =
 
18.21, p. < .001. No trials or interaction effects were
 
obtained.
 
Group 2 fA4-/AX+ (Phase)). Subjects mean causal strength
 
to worker X was higher in Group 3 than the ratings in Group
 
2. As expected. Group 2 (Phase) and Group 3 (Control)
 
differed in mean causal strength ratings to worker X (Joe),
 
see Figure 2. A 2 X 6 (Groups X Trials) repeated measures
 
ANOVA revealed a significant group effect, F (1, 46) =5.16,
 
p < .028. No trials or interaction effects were obtained.
 
Confidence
 
Given the importance of the primary measure, causal
 
judgment strength or strength of "invariance seeking
 
action," it was important to determine that the results were
 
not an artifact of the conditioning procedure. Specifically,
 
we attempted to eliminate the alternative explanation that
 
conditioned causal judgment strength ratings differed as a
 
result of the subjects' confidence in their judgments.
 
Therefore, subjects were asked to rate their confidence
 
in their causality judgment on each conditioning trail. Not
 
surprisingly, a simple repeated measures ANOVA revealed a
 
significant trials effect for confidence ratings of causal
 
strength to A+ (Sam) in Group 2 (Phase), F (5, 115) = 5.07,
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p.< .001. That is, with increasing experience, the subjects'
 
confidence in their causal judgments to A (Sam) predictably
 
increased across trials (see Figure 3). Two 2 X 6 (Groups X
 
Trials) repeated measures ANOVA on the X+ test trials for
 
the blocking effect comparisons described above failed to
 
reveal any statistically reliable differences for subjects
 
confidence ratings.
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DISCUSSION
 
The goal of the present study was to use modern
 
conditioning theory to examine processes underlying human
 
judgments of causality. The present study was a part of a
 
larger program of research designed to extend previous work
 
in causal attribution (e.g., Johnston, 1995; Kuhn, 1993;
 
William, 1994). It was our intention to not only overlap
 
current thinking in social psychology, but to eventually
 
contribute novel explanations and predictions for familiar
 
and unfamiliar results. The causal attribution research
 
described in the literature, although clearly sophisticated,
 
does not yet contain a systematic foundation for predicting
 
and explaining social attributions in context. It was our
 
intention to extend current attribution theory, which has
 
primarily focused on simple contiguity mechanisms or rule
 
governed approaches by testing additional principles guided
 
by contemporary associative learning. Blocking effects, in
 
learning psychology, have not eliminated the explanatory
 
power of contiguity but have indicated that a simple-

contiguity model for relationship (cause/effect) results is
 
not sufficient for explaining those results. Attribution
 
theory can be extended by testing specific predictions about
 
how causal attributions acquire strength over repeated
 
presentations of relevant information. And, by specifying
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group differences based on different cause and effect
 
(CS/US) pairings.
 
In addition, the associative tradition in philosophy
 
views conditioning not as a response passed from one
 
stimulus to another, but instead, as the learning that
 
results from exposure to relations among events in the
 
environment. Given this distinction between historical
 
models of conditioning and contemporary learning theory,
 
hypotheses analogous to those developed by modern
 
conditioning researchers were tested. More specifically, we
 
generated hypotheses to test acquisition effects and
 
blocking effects in causal attribution.
 
Acquisition Effects
 
The acquisition effect hypothesis was tested by pairing
 
a single worker (CS analog) and a company's productivity
 
information (US analog). We predicted that acquisition was a
 
function of repeated pairings of the CS analog with
 
reinforcement (US analog). In particular, we expected and
 
found that repeated pairings of a single worker (A) with
 
company productivity information would result in the
 
development of stronger casual attributions to the worker
 
over trials. Causal attributions or "Invariance seeking
 
actions" {(ISA) = CR analog} were evidenced by observing a
 
negatively accelerated increasing function for ISA's across
 
evaluation trials (Rules of Correspondence 1 - 5).
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The observation acquisition effect is extremely
 
important. Shanks and Dickinson (1987) argued that increases
 
in causal attribution contingency judgment strength
 
resulting from experience represents an important difference
 
between rule governed approaches and associative approaches
 
to an analysis of human causal judgment. Allan (1993)7
 
examined rule governed and associative accounts of human
 
contingency judgments and concluded that the available data
 
were best explained by associative principles. Acquisition
 
effects played an important;role in defining differences
 
between the cognitive and the Pavlovian accounts. An
 
inspection of Figure 1 also indicated that subjects,
 
unexpectedly, started out at a relatively high level of
 
casual strength (M = 66.04). Theoretically, beginning at a
 
lower level of causal strength would have enhanced the
 
acquisition effect, defined as amount of change across
 
conditioning trials. A possible explanation for the higher
 
initial ratings is.that subjects were, informed about a
 
hypothetical "productivity goal" (see Appendix A, page 45).
 
The level of production reported each month exceeded this
 
arbitrary goal, therefore a certain amount of productivity
 
success could be inferred. As a result/ judgments of
 
causality and therefore acquisition of cause would not be
 
expected to begin at a "zero" level.
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Blocking Effects
 
The blocking effect hypothesis was based on the
 
expectation that conditioning to a single antecedent
 
stimulus takes place in a context containing any number of
 
additional stimuli. We found support for the prediction that
 
causal attributions to a target stimulus worker X would be
 
blocked when he was paired with company productivity
 
information in the presence of another worker. A, who
 
already reliably predicted the same productivity level.
 
(Rules of Correspondence 1 - 5 and 8). Regardless of
 
conditions, random or phase, significant blocking effects
 
were observed. For both the randomized and phase blocking
 
procedures, causal attributions to worker X were less than
 
attributions to worker X in the control group.
 
Interestingly, the random procedure evidenced a somewhat
 
greater reduction in causal attribution strength than the
 
phase procedure. Theoretically, a simple contiguity process
 
should have yielded similar causal judgments to worker X
 
across the three groups, however, the result of the present
 
research indicated that evaluations of the worker as an
 
effective "cause" decreased as the baserate productivity had
 
already been established by presentations of another worker
 
A with production information.
 
The present research underscores the importance of the
 
"causal environment" with regard to attributions in the
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workplace. Consistent with our research, Japanese principles
 
of manageinent (e.g., Deming Model) suggest that performance
 
appraisals can be confounded by the context, or "system"
 
within which the individual works. In traditional employee
 
evaluations, however, context effects are not usually a
 
consideration and as a result may lead to erroneous
 
conclusions regarding the worker's overall effectiveness.
 
Recall that the target worker X's performance in the present
 
study did not vary across experimental groups. However, the
 
"supervisors" (the subjects) rated worker X in Groups 1 and
 
2 as less effective when company productivity level was
 
already predicted by another worker who reliably predicted
 
productivity performance.
 
Confidence Ratings
 
Group differences in the subjects' causal judgments
 
were expected to be the result of learning-theoretical
 
manipulations effecting the associative process, not the
 
result of increases or decreases in confidence in making the
 
judgments themselves. To determine that subjects' causality
 
judgments were not confounded by confidence in their
 
judgments, subjects were asked to rate their confidence in
 
their judgments using a 0 to 100 point scale. Consistent
 
with a priori predictions, confidence ratings increased
 
across the evaluation trials, indicating increased
 
confidence resulting from experience (see Figure 3), but
 
46
 
subject confidence did not differ between experimental
 
groups. Subjects were not confused, rather, they responded
 
in a predictable manner, making orderly judgments to the
 
stimuli presented. This outcome is consistent with
 
confidence ratings reported by Shanks and Dickinson (1987),
 
and provides additional support for the associative learning
 
model of causal judgment strength.
 
Limitations on Reported Effects
 
The results, like the results form any theory-generated
 
research program, should be interpreted within a narrow
 
range of conditions (Logan, 1959). In fact, the method used
 
here served as an explicit statement of some of the boundary
 
conditions, particularly in regard to the discrete trials
 
procedure (e.g. repeated CS-US analog pairings, temporal
 
variables held constant, US analog intensity held constant,
 
etc.). In social psychology, investigations regarding
 
strength of causal judgments frequently use descriptions of
 
social action rather than presenting information about
 
behavior over time. That is, subjects are frequently asked
 
to make an attribution based on information from a single
 
description. The present study, because it used analogies of
 
a familiar learning paradigm, involved multiple
 
presentations of the stimuli, an experienced situation. The
 
context effects reported here, using an analog of the short
 
delay conditioning paradigm, may generalize only to
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situations where information is presented repeatedly rather
 
than merely described. However, studies have shown that
 
conditioning analogies from both instrumental and Pavlovian
 
learning models have successfully been used to study a
 
variety of social phenomena. Other conditioning analogies
 
include attraction (Clore & Bryne, 1974; Cramer, Wiess,
 
Steigleder, & Balling, 1985); competition (Steigleder,
 
Wiess, Cramer, & Feinberg, 1978); altruism (Wiess, Buchanan,
 
Altstatt, & Lombardo, 1971); and male sex-role action
 
(Cramer, Lutz, Bartell, Dragna, & Helzer, 1989).
 
Furthermore, Shanks (1991) argued that an innate mechanism
 
for associative learning exists and functions in experienced
 
situations, especially when those experienced situations are
 
unfamiliar. Judgments in described situations would then be
 
based on the judgments developed over time from the
 
experienced situations. It is the purpose of the present
 
paper to identify general laws of learning that might
 
account for all types of causal judgments in both
 
descriptive and experienced situations.
 
Implications for Future Research
 
Because of the trend toward forming small groups of
 
employees or teams in a variety of contextual arrangements,
 
future research is warranted in testing a "supervisor's"
 
strength of causality judgments to part-time employees in
 
other novel and more complex situations that are analogous
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to learning phenomena. In addition to the acguisition and
 
blocking predictions, a reinforcement-context type theory
 
(see Rules of Correspondence) can generate a number of
 
hypotheses. Although various kinds of sophisticated stimuli
 
and reinforcers could be used, the predictions offered here
 
employ discriminable workers and productivity levels,
 
respectively. The present procedure allowed us to condition
 
causal strength to Sam on the A+ trials. As a result, on
 
the AX+ trials Joe was paired with company production
 
information in the context of someone who predicts this
 
particular effect, worker Sam. Worker Joe is redundant in
 
this case; he predicts nothing new, at least in terms of
 
productivity information. Blocking of causal attribution
 
strength to Joe would be expected and was observed. However,
 
if worker X is presented in a compound with another worker
 
A, but A and X are paired with higher levels of productivity
 
(magnitude of reinforcement), worker X is not redundant and
 
therefore would not be blocked. Compared to attributions of
 
cause to worker X in a control group, where productivity
 
information would be held constant on the A+ and AX+ trials,,
 
subjects in the experimentar group with the higher levels of
 
productivity would be expected to rate X more at cause. That
 
is unblocking is expected to occur if the presence of worker
 
X signals higher levels of productivity (Rule 9) than the
 
productivity level used in the initial acquisition of causal
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strength to worker A.
 
Whereas the blocking of causal attribution to worker (X)
 
results from prior experience with a worker (A), who already
 
predicts company productivity, augmenting of a worker (X)
 
results from prior experience with a worker (A) who
 
predicts no information about the company's level of
 
productivity. Kelley's augmenting principle suggests that,
 
if a cause can succeed in producing the behavior in the face
 
of an "inhibitor", the cause will be seen as having a
 
greater role than if it were presented alone. For example
 
imagine that the worker Sam is associated with no
 
information about a company's productivity level. Suppose
 
the company hires a new employee, Joe, to work with Sam and
 
productivity level information is now available, Joe's
 
perceived effectiveness as a contributor to the company's
 
productivity, in the context of worker Sam, who does not
 
predict such information, is expected to be augmented, or
 
increased. The above examples of the future research are
 
intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive of the
 
predictions which can be generated using the Rules of
 
Correspondence listed above.
 
Conclusion
 
The specific construction of a reinforcement-context type
 
theory and the sample predictions generated from it clearly
 
demonstrates the importance we place on recognizing the role
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context plays in the development of causal attribution.
 
Overall, the present study was supported. Acquisition and
 
blocking effects of causal attribution to a worker were
 
observed in support of the study's hypotheses.
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APPENDIX A
 
Instructions for all Experimental Groups
 
Preliminary Instructions. In this study we are interested in
 
testing a computerized employee evaluation system. Your
 
cooperation is necessary for testing the usefulness of this
 
automated program. In order to carefully test the
 
effectiveness of the system, you will need to assume the
 
role of a supervisor in a small company. You will be given
 
information about a part-time employee, Joe and his
 
company's level of productivity. Joe is a college student
 
who is available for only part-time employment. It is
 
important to evaluate Joe carefully each month because he
 
will be considered for full time employment upon graduation.
 
Instructions Prior to Practice Trial. On some occasions,
 
the left side of the screen will show a picture of a part-

time employee named Sam or Joe. On other occasions, the left
 
side of the screen will show a picture both part time
 
employees named Sam and Joe. On the right side of the screen
 
is a graph depicting the company's monthly productivity
 
level will be presented.' Productivity is measured on a 0-10
 
point scale. The company's monthly productivity goal is set
 
at level 5.
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Appendix A (cont'd)
 
Following each monthly productivity report you will be
 
asked to rate the employees on their OVERALL performance on
 
a "0 to 100" point scale. After reading each item carefully
 
please respond by using the numeric keypad on the right side
 
of the keyboard. After entering any number between "0 to
 
100" (including 100) please wait for the next evaluation
 
item to appear.
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APPENDIX B
 
Consent form
 
I am volunteering to participate as a subject in this study.
 
I understand that the purpose of this;study is to test the
 
efficiency of a computerized employee evaluation system. I
 
understand that the information will be presented to me via
 
a computer monitor and that I will be asked to assume the
 
role of a production supervisor in a large company. I
 
understand that my name will NOT be included in the
 
experiment itself and that my anonymity will be maintained
 
at all times. I also understand that my participation in
 
this study is voluntary and that I may refuse to answer any
 
questions at any. I also understand that I may withdraw
 
from this study at any time without penalty or prejudice. I
 
also understand that any questions I may have regarding this
 
study will be answered.
 
I understand that all the information collected in this
 
study will be treated as confidential with no details about
 
my responses released to anyone outside the research staff
 
without my separate and specific written consent. I
 
understand that I may derive no specific benefit from
 
participation in this study, except perhaps from feeling
 
that I have contributed to the development of psychological
 
knowledge.
 
I hereby allow this research group to publish the results of
 
this study in which I am participating, with the provision
 
that my name and/or other identifying information be
 
withheld. This study is being conducted by psychology
 
students under the supervision of Dr. Robert Cramer, PS­
211, extension 5576. 1 understand that if 1 have any
 
questions or concerns about the study or the informed
 
consent process 1 may also contact the Psychology Department
 
Human Subjects Review Board at CSUSB.
 
Participants Signature: --—■ 
Participants Name (Printed) :■ 
Date:-■— —■——---­
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APPENDIX C
 
Debriefing Statement
 
The present study is part of a series of research
 
projects research projects designed to investigate human
 
social causal judgments. Unfortunately, in order to
 
adequately investigate this social phenomenon a small
 
deception of the subjects was necessary. Rather than
 
directly asking questions concerning your social causal
 
judgments, we explained the study as testing the efficiency
 
of a computerized Employee Evaluation System. The company,
 
its employees, and the evaluation system were fictitious.
 
We apologize for this deception, however, if we had asked
 
directly about your causal judgments your responses may have
 
been effected.
 
(Stop. Are there any questions?)
 
It is our sincere hope that the necessity for deception
 
is understood. It is important for the completion of this
 
study that you do not speak with other students on campus
 
about your experience here today. If other potential
 
subjects are aware of the purpose of the experiment, the
 
results of the study might be compromised.
 
The present study conforms to the ethical principles
 
established by the American Psychological Association. We
 
are interested in obtaining your comments or reaction
 
regarding your participation in our experiment. This
 
information would serve as a basis for checking and
 
evaluating the quality and care with which our research is
 
conducted. Please feel free to comment or ask questions.
 
For results concerning the present study contact Dr. Robert
 
Cramer, at (714)-880-5576.
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APPENDIX D
 
CS/US Single Stimulus A (Sam) Trial
 
OEPARTMENT 
P 
R 4 
O 
0 3 
U 
0 i 
L 1 
SAM PRODVOHyiTY 
56
 
 Appendix D (cont'd)
 
CS/US Compound Stimulus AX+ fSam and Joe) Trial
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